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50,000 warheads, having a destructive power more than one million
times greater than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
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It is becoming common knowledge" that the combined nuclear
arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union contain more than
50,000 warheads, having a destructive power more than one million
times greater than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. In
terms of blast equivalences, these weapons represent four tons of TNT
for every living person on earth. One United States Polaris submarine
can destroy 128 Soviet sites, and carries more firepower than all the
weapons used in World War II. The new Trident submarines are still
more powerful. These new weapon systems and the underlying strategic
planning leave old notions of deterrence behind. These weapons are
building toward a capacity to fight as well as to deter nuclear war, and
some civilian and military analysts are even asserting that a nuclear
war can be fought and "won". The United States and NATO have
long expressed their policy to use nuclear weapons first - especially
"tactical" nuclear weapons - if necessary, to stop a Soviet invasion of
Europe.2
The United States is improving and developing more and more
precise missiles and anti-submarine systems, thereby affording the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. The next several pages draw heavily on the literature of the Lawyers Alliance
for Nuclear Arms Control, Inc., 11 Beacon Street, Suite 719, Boston, Mass., 02108,
but any one of dozens of contemporary sources would have done as well. This group
seeks to end lawyer apathy in the area. This is especially critical since lawyers learn
and practice the skills of conflict resolution which are the very skills that must be ap-
plied to the nuclear arms race if we are to avoid nuclear war. Lawyers separate fact
from fancy, distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, and negotiate lasting agree-
ments building upon common or compatible interests in efforts to obtain peaceful solu-
tions to problems of conflict. Nowhere are these skills more in need today than in nu-
clear arms limitation, reduction and elimination.
2. See Mossberg, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 4, col. 1, Haig and Weinberger
here confirmed this policy under the heading Nato Chief Warns of New Soviet Strat-
egy to Deny the West the Use of Its Nuclear Punch.
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United States a theoretical first-strike attack capability. It will be a
"counterforce" capability having the power to destroy all or most of the
Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. This "counterforce" capability is
claimed to be defensive only, but since the weapons can deliver a first-
strike, it can be seen as offensive as well. Military analysts expect the
Soviet Union to have this same first-strike capability sometime before
the end of this decade.3
The possibility of intentional full-scale nuclear war hangs by a
hair trigger. Such a war would last only a matter of hours. If launched
from the Atlantic Ocean, missiles from the new Trident submarine
could hit Moscow in just ten minutes. Morever, Pershing II missiles are
currently scheduled for deployment in West Germany. They could hit
targets in the Soviet Union in a mere four minutes. The Soviets have
similar capabilities. Thus, it is obvious that the White House or the
Kremlin will have only a few minutes in which to evaluate a report of
an incoming missile attack.and decide whether to launch a nuclear
strike in response. It is quite possible that technological advances will
force this decision to be delegated to computers and their "specialists".
Indeed, if a non-first-strike nuclear power is confronted by another nu-
clear power possessing a first-strike counterforce capability, it can be
considered "rational for the non-first strike power to adopt a "launch
on attack" or "launch on report" policy. It is widely feared the Soviets
may adopt such a policy if the United States maintains its present phi-
losophy. The destiny of mankind would then have been turned over to
machines.
The probability of accidental nuclear war is genuine and increas-
ing. The warning system of the United States Air Command has re-
ported hundreds of false alarms about incoming missiles, and has oth-
erwise malfunctioned. No American actually knows the reliability of
the Soviet Union's command and control systems. Yet, ironically, for
all the billions they have spent on defense, the American people must
rely every day on the Soviet systems to prevent our destruction. So far,
the Soviet systems have been sufficiently reliable to protect Americans
from a wave of nuclear weapons launched because of an accident or
malfunction. But how long will security last? Currently, six countries
3. See supra note 1.
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admit they have atomic arms." By the end of this century, an additional
two dozen countries are expected to have nuclear weapons, thereby in-
creasing dramatically the probability of accidental, or intentional, nu-
clear war.
Indeed, the existence of a "counterforce" first-strike nuclear capa-
bility that could destroy most of an opponent's nuclear weapons while
they remain on the ground, makes nuclear war appear "rational" under
certain circumstances. Suppose for example that Iran, with Soviet
backing, masses its military forces to invade Saudi Arabia and the
Arab Emerites, thereby eliminating most of Europe's and Japan's oil
supply, as well as much of our own. Irreparably crippled, the United
States, invoking the Carter Doctrine,5 declares its vital security interest
threatened and prepares to intervene. It can do so effectively only by
using American troops. The Soviet Union threatens the United States,
saying it will not tolerate U.S. troops fighting in Iran or Saudi Arabia,
which are just below its southern border. It then masses its troops on
the Iranian border. Perceiving this development as further threatening
its vital interests, the United States responds by placing its nuclear
forces on a "red" ready alert. The Soviet Union responds by placing its
nuclear forces on ready alert. Negotiations between the Soviet Union
and the United States deteriorate and finally break down. Iran's troops
begin to cross the border and invade Saudi Arabia.
IF either the United States or the Soviet Union concludes that: (1)
negotiations have irretrievably broken down and are of no further avail
and (2) war is surely coming, then, under these circumstances, voices
on both sides will be raised declaring that a nuclear first-strike is fully
"rational". It is better, it will be argued, for us to attack first and de-
stroy as many Soviet missiles as possible, thereby suffering only 25 to
30 million dead Americans from a crippled Soviet nuclear response,
than to lose fifty to eighty million or more Americans and most of our
nuclear weapons, by waiting and absorbing a full power Soviet nuclear
4. United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, China, India and al-
though she does not admit it, most people believe Israel has them as well.
5. The Carter Doctrine, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 197 (Jan. 23, 1980)
which states: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America, and such assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military force."
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first-strike attack.
Once war is perceived as inevitable in a world where the United
States and the Soviet Union each possesses a first-strike capability, it
will be declared "rational" to initiate nuclear war in a deteriorating
crisis situation in order to destroy the other side's missiles and limit
casualties. If one accepts this analysis, is there any American who
knows the Soviet mind well enough to predict the exact point at which,
in a deteriorating crisis situation, the Soviets will perceive war as inevi-
table, or vice-versa? Assuming one side or the other perceives war as
inevitable, on which side does prudence lie? Shall millions of preventa-
ble deaths be risked by not striking first, or shall it be a race between
Americans and Soviets to press the button first? A bilateral first-strike
situation is inherently unstable, especially during a deteriorating crisis.
How should a democracy like the United States respond?
In foreign and military affairs, the general will of the population
of a democracy is what the leaders determine it to be, and particularly
for nuclear war prospects, what the President determines it to be. In a
free society, no president normally would reach any momentous deci-
sion without consultation, without considering the widest scope of avail-
able opinions, without the best information he can obtain, and without
patient and deep reflection on where the common interests of the people
lie. But all of this takes time, much time, and time is precisely what is
not available in the nuclear timetable. Neither the Congress, the peo-
ple, nor any other authority, can make the decision for the President.
The decision is essentially individual, and therefore autocratic. In the
logic of nuclear war, the President, by circumstances of mutual, first-
strike capability, is condemned to be a dictator. That is contrary to our
democratic order, and a question arises, therefore, as to whether the
Constitution applies to this situation.
The War Power
The Constitutional Convention was convened on May 25, 1787,
and was concluded on September 17, less than four months later.'
6. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 649 (M. Farrand ed.
1911) [hereinafter cited as 2 RECORDS]. There is no complete or entirely reliable re-
cord of the Convention's deliberations. The Convention's delegates met in secret and
resolved to communicate nothing to non-delegates. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
1152 7:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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Fifty-five men attended in all, but the significant work was done by far
fewer. For the first two months, the Convention devoted itself mainly to
discussions, developing and perfecting resolutions. In late July, those
resolutions on which agreement had been reached were turned over to
the Committee on Detail, and on July 26, the Convention adjourned for
ten days, until August 6, to permit that Committee of five to create a
draft of the Constitution.7
The Committee's draft constitution assigned Congress the power
"to make war." Later on August 17, Charles Pinkney opposed vesting
the power to make war in Congress, saying "its proceedings were too
slow." He argued that the "Senate would be the best depository, being
more acquainted with foreign affairs and most capable of proper reso-
lution." 10 Pierce Butler countered, saying that if informed judgment
and efficiency were the standards to be applied, then the Senate suf-
fered the same disabilities as Congress; consequently, he was "for vest-
ing the power in the President. ... "l Thereafter, James Madison and
Elbridge Gerry "moved to insert 'declare', striking out 'make' war;
leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks. 12 Roger
Sherman thought it stood very well. "The Executive [should] be able to
repel and not commence war."13 Elbridge Gerry said that he "never
expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower th Executive alone
to declare war." 14 Oliver Ellsworth observed that "there is a material
VENTION OF 1787, at 10 n.4, xi (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as 1
RECORDS]. The Journal of the Convention recorded only the formal motions and the
votes thereon. Extensive, but incomplete notes were taken by several delegates - Ru-
fus King, James McHenry, William Pierce, William Paterson, Alexander Hamilton,
and George Mason. Id. at xvi-xxiv. The most important record, James Madison's notes,
was revised thirty years after the convention. Id. at vii.
7. 1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at xxii. John Rutledge of South Carolina was
Chairman, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania an important member.
8. 2 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 318: "Mr. Pinkney opposed vesting this power in
the legislature ..
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-43 (1800) where Justice
Samuel Chase wrote: "Congress is empowered to declare a general war or Congress
may wage a limited war. .. "
14. 2 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 318.
1531
5
Morris: The Constitution and Nuclear Defense
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
154 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
difference between the cases of making war and making peace,"2 and
that "it should be more easy to get out of a war, than into it." ' . George
Mason "was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because
not [safely] to be trusted with it . . .he was for clogging rather than
facilitating war; but for facilitating peace; '17 thus, "he preferred 'de-
clare' to 'make." "8 Thereafter, the vote was called and "the motion to
insert 'declare' in place of 'make' passed."19
This result is not surprising because the authors of our Constitu-
tion had all been reared with the axiom, endlessly repeated before and
after the American Revolution, that standing armies and their com-
manders are always a menace to the liberties of a free people. The
dangers posed by a standing army were repeatedly dealt with during
the ratification debates, and it accounted for significant opposition to
the proposed constitution.
There is no ambiguity or uncertainty about the general intent of
the framers of the Constitution with respect to the war power.
[It] was understood by the framers - and subsequent usage con-
firmed their understanding - that the President in his capacity as
commander in chief of the armed forces would have the right, in-
deed the duty, to use the armed forces to repel sudden attacks on
the United States, even in advance of Congressional authorization
to do so. . .[and] ...that he would direct and lead the armed
forces and put them to any use specified by Congress but that this
did not extend to the initiation of hostilities....20
15. Id. at 319 (emphasis original).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis original).
19. Id. (emphasis original). By defining the issue in terms of the power to "de-
clare" war, the framers may have confused later generations. The real issue was con-
gressional authorization of hostilities, full or partial, against a foreign sovereign state.
The framers meant to vest that power as well as the power ultimately to control gen-
eral or limited war in the hands of Congress. The President was to be the commander-
in-chief, subject to Congress' ultimate control.
20. National Commitments, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957),
quoted in G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (10th
ed. 1980). In 1801, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, ruled that the
"'whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Con-
gress ... the Congress may authorize general hostilities ... or partial hostili-
6
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In a letter to Madison in 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "We have
already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of War by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the
Legislative body. .. .
One conclusion is clear: the so-called doctrine of a President at-
tacking first and making war as anticipatory self- defense, allegedly
justified by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter, has no historical
standing in American Constitutional law.
The United States had a puny, regular military force of less than
840 men when George Washington assumed the Presidency under the
new constitution, 22 nevertheless, the framers sorely worried about war
and the dangers posed by the military. They denied the President the
power to initiate hostilities and embroil the nation in war. Presidents in
the 19th Century interpreted their commander-in-chief powers differ-
ently, but on the whole, the basic constitutional framework was gener-
ally observed. Presidents did not initiate war. Summarizing the war
power in the 19th Century, Robert William Russell wrote:
It is not a simple matter to arrive at conclusions concerning this
period in which the constitutional interpretation was far from con-
sistent, where Grant's extreme view is sandwiched between the con-
servative views of Buchanan and Cleveland. But there was one
opinion that enjoyed wide acceptance: the President could constitu-
tionally employ American military force outside the nation as long
as he did not use it to commit "acts of war." While the term was
never precisely defined, an "act of war" in this context usually
meant the use of military force against a sovereign nation without
that nation's consent and without that nation's having declared war
upon or used force against The United States. To perform acts of
war, the President needed the authorization of Congress ....
This dividing line between the proper spheres of legislative and
executive authority was sufficiently flexible to permit the President
to use military force in unimportant cases, while preserving the role
of Congress in important decisions. The acts of war doctrine was
probably a step beyond what the framers intended when they
changed the Congressional power from "make" war to "declare"
ties. .. ." Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 1, 28 (1801).
21. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 418.
22. A. SOIFER, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 116 (1976).
1551The Constitution and Nuclear Defense1 7:1982
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war, and was certainly a move in the direction of Presidential
power compared to the cautious stance of Washington, Adams, Jef-
ferson, and Madison. The central objective which the Constitution
sought - Congressional authority to approve the initiation of ma-
jor conflicts - was undamaged, but certain fraying of the edges
had occurred. This slight deterioration was greatly accelerated dur-
ing the following 50 years.28
The 19th Century presidents used the military forces in "hot pur-
suit" of bands of pirates or bandits or to protect American lives and
property under treaties conferring rights and obligations on the United
States. But early 20th Century presidents - Theodore Roosevelt, Taft,
and Wilson - expanded the scope of presidential power by using mili-
tary force against small sovereign states, and Congress did not resist.2 '
Later, in 1941, "President Roosevelt, on his own authority, committed
American forces to the defense of Greenland and Iceland and author-
ized American naval vessels to escort convoys to Iceland";25 thus, "by
the time Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, in the
wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had
already been committed by its president, acting on his own authority,
to an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic. ' '2e
The trend begun by Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, and
accelerated by Franklin Roosevelt, increasingly continued under Presi-
dents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, "bringing
the country to the point at which the real power to commit the country
to war is now in the hands of the president. 2  thus, the power to con-
duct foreign affiars,28 the campaign for government secrecy, and the
23. R. Russell, The United States Congress and the Power to Use Military Force
Abroad (Ph.D. thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1967) reported in NA-
TIONAL SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); quoted in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416, 418 (10th ed. 1980).
24. G. GUNTHER, supra note 23, at 419.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
where the Court seemingly affirmed an inherent superior presidential power over for-
eign affairs, not derived from constitutional or statutory sources. Compare Bestor, infra
note 28.
28. For an enlightening analysis of this power, and the meaning of the King's
Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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commander-in-chief powers were combined and used in ways that even-
tually produced the current "Imperial Presidency": 29
The imperial presidency was essentially the creation of foreign pol-
icy. A combination of doctrines and emotions - belief in perma-
nent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and
the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of
the world - had brought about the unprecedented centralization
of decisions over war and peace in the presidency. With this there
came an unprecendented exclusion of the rest of the executive
branch, of Congress, of the press and of public opinion in general
from these decisions. Prolonged war in Vietnam strengthened the
tendencies toward both centralization and exlusion. So the imperial
presidency grew at the expense of the constitutional order. Like the
cowbird, it hatched its own eggs and pushed the others out of the
nest. And, as it overwhelmed the traditional separation of powers
in foreign affairs, it began to aspire toward an equivalent centrali-
zation of power in the domestic polity.30
However, the war powers as spelled out in the Constitution and its
balances between Congress and the President are not obsolete. All that
is required is for Congress actively and continually to reassert its con-
stitutional authority over the use of American military force. Ulti-
mately, congressional action will be founded upon enlightened, press
influenced public opinion. This opinion obviously will affect the presi-
dency since that office is also highly susceptible to public influence.
A first step was taken by Congress when it passed the War Powers
Resolution in 1973, stating its purpose was
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United
States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
power of "advice and consent," see Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of
Foreign Affairs, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1974).
29. For discussion, see A. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
30. Id. at 207.
1571
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situations.31
This legislation, however, does not fully restore the intent of the fram-
ers. The framers did not rely on the collective judgment of Congress
and President to initiate hostilities, but solely on Congressional declara-
tion to introduce military forces into hostilities, except in limited cases
of presidential repulsion of a sudden attack on the United States. Nev-
ertheless, the statute is useful, so long as it is seen as a first step to be
followed by others. It confirms the constitutional position that the doc-
trine of presidentially created war as anticipatory self-defense has no
constitutional standing, and it helps to restore part of the constitutional
balance. The rest of the balance can be restored if the American people
have the will and have the vision to do so. Alexander Hamilton was
prophetic in seeing the consequences of a people living in a garrison
state. He implied the need for continuous vigilance by the people. In a
striking passage, Hamilton observed "safety from external danger is
the most powerful director of national conduct, .. [and] . . . [e]ven
the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. 32
Hamilton prophetically concluded that the "violent destruction of life
and property incident to war-the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to
liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights." 3
31. The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.
Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1488 (H.R.J. Res. 542,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. adopted over Presidential veto on Nov. 7, 1973). (This statute is
an unusual, quasi-constitutional variety of congressional action, not setting forth sub-
stantive policy but processes and relationships. Query: is it clear, is it not, that Con-
gress did not go far enough and failed to restore the original intent?)
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 45 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
33. Id.
1158 Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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Presidential Power and Nuclear War
It seems relatively straightforward to conclude that the President
has no constitutional power to initiate a nuclear war by authorizing a
preemptive nuclear first-strike. That clearly would be a functional
"declaration" of war in its most emphatic and destructive form, and
only Congress has that power under our Constitution. Moreover, as the
United Nations repeatedly has declared, the threat or use of nuclear
weapons is a "crime against mankind and civilization.'
But does the President, after receiving a radar or other report of
an incoming wave of nuclear missiles, have constitutional power to au-
thorize a responsive nuclear missile strike? The War Powers Resolution
of 1973 permits the President "to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities" 35 in the event of "a national emergency created
by attack upon the United States . . .or its armed forces."36 this pro-
vision clearly contemplates the use of military manpower and it may be
so limited, but arguably it may also include hardware, such as nuclear
missiles. Thus, the statutory situation is somewhat murky. Yet clearly,
a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union based on radar alone, or some
other report, does not come within the statute because the reports may,
like others in the past, be in error. At that moment only a report exists
and neither the United States nor its armed forces have actually been
"attacked". The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense by a President is
ruled out. Likewise, the situation would not fall within the provision of
the President's Constitutional power to repel sudden attacks because
the "attack" had not yet occurred. On the other hand, if the reports
were true and if the President waited until after the "attack" on the
United States actually occurred, he may be left with very few, if any,
missiles with which to respond. Of course, in such a situation, a ques-
tion exists concerning the good to be achieved by authorizing a re-
sponding nuclear attack with the remaining missiles, which would only
produce another nuclear attack on the United States with the Soviet
Union's remaining missiles.
34. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc A/5100
(1961). This resolution was adopted Nov. 24, 1961, by a vote of 55-20, with 26 absten-
tions. The United States voted "No". The U.S.S.R. voted "yes".
35. See supra, note 31.
36. Id.
11
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It may be true that neither the Constitution nor the War Powers
Resolution was designed to apply to the conditions of nuclear war. Nu-
clear war is fundamentally different from warfare by tank, machine
gun, and airplane. It is a crime against humanity. But, under the Con-
stitution as it currently exists, it appears reasonably correct to conclude
(1) that the President has no constitutional power to order a pre-emp-
tive, nuclear first-strike and thereby initiate nuclear war; (2) that the
President has no constitutional power to order a nuclear attack solely in
response to reports of an incoming wave of missiles, and (3) that the
President has no emergency power to "repel" a nuclear attack already
fully completed. If the President has any power, it would only be to
repel a nuclear attack on the United States that is in process by au-
thorizing a responding nuclear attack after the United States actually
has been attacked. Of course, by then, there may be very little left with
which to respond or little reason to do so. It is difficult to see how an
American nuclear attack on the Soviet Union authorized during or fol-
lowing a nuclear attack on the United States by the Soviet Union can
be characterized as "repelling" the initial attack. Nothing is "re-
pelled", and the concept loses its meaning in a nuclear context. More-
over, the whole concept of presidential power "to repel a sudden at-
tack" on the United States presupposes (1) that the purpose of such
presidential power is to gain time sufficient for Congress to convene
and act, and (2) that things called "Congress", "the United States",
and "the American people" will continue to exist after the President
exercises his power to repel sudden attack. If neither of these two
presuppositions exist, as neither would if we absorbed a full, nuclear
strike from the Soviet Union, then the whole rationale for the concept
of presidential power "to repel sudden attack" disappears. Rather
clearly, it seems, the existence of a first-strike posture in the possible
use of nuclear weapons is unconstitutional and should be dropped as a
policy option.37
A president may act contrary to the constitutional requirements in
each of the above three situations, arguing emergency presidential pre-
rogative, 8 a doctrine dangerous to a free society. The founding fathers
37. For a recent discussion of this point solely as a matter of policy, see Bundy,
Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 753 (Spring 1982).
38. Machiavelli argued that all republics in times of crisis need a dictatorship
12
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did not completely deny power to use military force to the President.
They permitted him to repel a sudden attack, and this recognizes, in
part, an emergency power in the President, but the prerogative is not
unqualified. Nevertheless, some presidents have gone well beyond their
carefully circumscribed power. It appears that Lincoln acted on a the-
ory of wide presidential prerogative during the Civil War,39 as did
Roosevelt during World War II,40 and Kennedy during the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis.
So long as presidents believe they will be successful in their ac-
tions, they will continue to claim emergency prerogative. But, what
would count as "success" in any of the above three situations involving
nuclear war? Our safety may turn on the quirks of mind of a particular
president and on how he judges "success" and how he sees himself in
the annals of history. The pathway to real "success" is set forth in
Professor Arthur Miller's article.
Professor Miller's stimulating and welcome analysis, seeking to
change our modes of thinking about nuclear war, goes well beyond my
argument set forth above. He holds that the manufacture, deployment,
and use of nuclear weapons are unconstitutional. By focusing solely on
and that it was better to provide for one by law than to have power usurped.
"[R]epublics which, when in imminent danger," Machiavelli said, "have recourse
neither to a dictatorship, nor to some form of authority analagous to it, will be ruined
when grave misfortune befalls them." 1 N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSE ch. 34, 291
(Routledge ed. 1950). Two and a half centuries later, Rousseau argued that the "abil-
ity to foresee that some things cannot be foreseen is a very necessary quality;" that the
"sacrosanct nature of the laws never should be interfered with save when the safety of
the state is in question," and at that point "the People's first concern must be to see
that the State shall not perish." 4 J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT ch. 6, 415-16 (Ox-
ford ed. 1947). Even John Stuart Mill stated he was "far from condemning, in cases of
extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dicta-
torship." J. MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
JOHN STUART MILL 408 (M. Cohen ed. 1961).
39. See Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, VIII A. LINCOLN, COMPLETE
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 161 (Nicolay & Hay eds. 1894), and letter from Abra-
ham Lincoln to Secretary Chase (Sept. 2, 1863) (which appears in IX A. LINCOLN,
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108 (Nicolay & Hay eds. 1894)); E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 382 (1940).
40. See Murphy, Request of the Senate for an Opinion as to the Powers of the
President In Emergency or State of War, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 343-48 (1939); 10 F.
ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 1941, at 195 (1950).
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the limited presidential power to repel attack, my argument is narrower
but parallels his, seeking to demonstrate only that the presidential core
of our nuclear first-strike capability strategy is unconstitutional. Profes-
sor Miller broadly attacks the nuclear establishment as a whole, argu-
ing boldly that constitutional law is instrumental and that it places a
duty on government officers NOT to take any action that, on balance,
unreasonably jeopardizes the well-being of the populace or "posterity."
He argues that constitutional law imposes a duty of negative content.
Although this part of the argument is neither set forth comprehensively
nor definitively, I find Professor Miller's preliminary statement
persuasive.
Two additional arguments and a general conclusion present some
surmountable difficulties. First, Professor Miller argues that interna-
tional law partially defines the duties the Constitution places on gov-
ernmental officers because it is incorporated into our constitutional
law.41 Second, he argues that international law, as stated by Richard
Falk and his colleagues, declares that any threat or contemplated use
of nuclear weapons constitutes a crime of state.42 The duty of govern-
ment officials, he argues, then becomes clear: "to take action to help
prevent that 'crime of state.' "43 Accepting the validity of the above two
arguments for discussion purposes, the requirement that government
officials "take action" does not follow from the prior general duty of
negative content that officials take no action that unreasonably jeopar-
dizes the well-being of the American people. Another step is needed, a
constitutional judgment from the Supreme Court that the current man-
ufacture, deployment, and contemplated use of nuclear weapons unrea-
sonably jeopardizes American well-being. Once that reasonable judg-
ment is made, then Professor Miller's arguments take hold and
Congress comes under a duty to act to undo the jeopardy to the Ameri-
can people. In doing so, it prevents a "crime of state". Such judgment
from the Supreme Court of the United States is, however, most un-
likely. That prospect, though, should not deter vigorous discussion of
this vital subject.
Should international law be part of constitutional law? Professor
41. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982).
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id.
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Miller argues it should. Surely, the part of international law that con-
flicts with the Constitution cannot be. My argument above indicates,
however, that part of international law outlawing a nuclear first-strike
position does not conflict with American constitutional law. Thus, that
portion of international law could be incorporated into American con-
stitutional law. Professor Miller's preliminary, creative, result-oriented
affirmative argument is intriguing indeed. Anyone who takes law and
humankind seriously must agree with his goal to eliminate nuclear
weapons. Yet, I suspect American officials will not accept Professor
Miller's argument without also knowing it has been agreed to by the
Soviets. Nevertheless, by opening debate, Professor Miller puts us in
his debt.
Professor Miller is quite right when he states that we must invent
the legal means, whether his or others, by which the world can peace-
fully settle the issues that previously have been settled by war. Until
the necessary legal means are created and institutionalized, any reduc-
tion in the steadily increasing probability of nuclear catastrophe is un-
likely in the absence of effective negotiations on the control, reduction
and elimination of arms. The limited progress that has been made to
control nuclear arms has come as a result of direct negotiations be-
tween the nuclear powers, and, in this country, has been accompanied
by enlightened citizen demands. In the United States, citizen enlighten-
ment in the area of arms control is crucial, but, happily, as John Jay
saw long ago, citizen interest in this area endures. "Among the many
objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their
attention," Jay declared, "that of providing for their safety seems to be
first"; and that means their "security for the preservation of peace and
tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence,
as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes."" Thus,
the legal profession becomes deeply implicated because it consists of
professionals whose skills are necessary to save mankind from nuclear
war. Lawyers have skills to separate fact from fancy; they can under-
stand nuclear strategies, and they can explain to the public the dangers
and constitutional status of our current nuclear posture. Lawyers also
are negotiators and indispensible advisors to policy makers. They nego-
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 14 (Q. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis
original).
163 117:1982
15
Morris: The Constitution and Nuclear Defense
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
164 Nova Law Journal 7:1982 I
tiate lasting agreements founded on the existence of common or com-
patible interests, including common and compatible interests of the So-
viet Union and the United States. It is these lawyerly skills, employed
in the service of Professor Miller's vision, that are sorely needed today
by the American people for their posterity. May they be forthcoming.
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